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Abstract  
This paper aims to critique the process of corporate-owned, high-tech start-up strategizing 
through an inductive, longitudinal, case-study of ‘UK-Research-Tech’. Insights are given 
through the combined ‘dialectical-paradox’ concept, thereby focusing on where ‘dialectic’ 
and ‘paradox’ theorising overlap. Our linked iterative, ‘dialogical-dialectic’ research 
approach also reflects CEO/TMT start-up dynamics over time. These foci fill important gaps 
that impede our better understanding of dialectical, dialogical and paradoxical forces within 
strategic decision-making. As an interpretative tool, they illuminate CEO/TMT strategizing 
and changing inter-relationships, affected by broader, volatile, techno-economic contexts, and 
parent-company influences on ventures. In this case-study, it was found that the CEO’s 
relatively autocratic, parent-framed approach combined with TMT members’ contradictory 
reactions to create ‘dialectical-paradox’ oppositional forces, eventually only resolved through 
‘eleventh hour’ business strategy changes to rescue the venture. This research contributes to 
more nuanced understandings of corporate-constrained ventures during early business 
development from start-up strategic decisions at parent-company level to subsequent 
conditions of more independent dynamic equilibrium. The ‘dialectical-paradox’ conceptual 
lens contributes an innovative critique of processes affecting strategic decision-making 
dynamics. Another important contribution is the empirically-inspired conceptual model, 
developed for use both to guide subsequent case-study research analyses and as a reflective 
tool for CEO/TMT strategic decision-making, especially within corporate inspired start-ups. 
Keywords: corporate-venture, start-up strategies, CEO-TMT interactions, dialectical-
paradoxes 
Introduction 
‘… dialectic without paradox would be suspect…’ (Kainz, 1988, p.vii). 
 
Strategy can be deliberate, rational, planned, or emergent, improvised, practical (Burgelman, 
1983, 1991; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985, 1990; Mintzberg, 1987); formed through 
intrapersonal functional unity/diversity and CEO/TMT inter-temporal dynamics (Cannella, 
Park and Lee, 2008; Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004; Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 
2002; Nielsen, 2010); and shaped by broader contexts (Pettigrew, 1992; Van de Ven, 1992; 
Whittington, 1996). This paper aims to explore strategising in a corporate-venture, UK-
Research-Tech, through dialectical theorising (Di Domenico, Tracey and Haugh, 2009; 
Mason, 1969) combined with paradox (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Cuhna, Clegg and Cuhna, 
2002), to highlight empirically and theoretically the innovative combined concept of 
‘dialectical-paradox’.  
 
Smith and Lewis (2011) have built ‘the foundation of an integrative model’ (p.386) of 
paradox, but also state that there remain ‘gaps that thwart a more cohesive understanding of 
paradox’ (Smith and Lewis, 2011, p.385). We aim to fill such empirical and theoretical gaps 
which we identify. Smith and Lewis (2011) distinguish ‘dialectic’ with ‘contradictory 
elements (thesis and antithesis) resolved through integration (synthesis), which, over time, 
will confront new opposition’ (p.387), from ‘paradox’ with ‘contradictory yet interrelated 
elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time’ (p.382). They state that ‘dialectics 
prove paradoxical when the contradictory and interrelated relationship between thesis and 
antithesis persists over time’ (p.387). This overlap is focussed upon and labelled in this paper 
as ‘dialectical-paradox’, an innovative combined concept, which enriches both paradox 
research/theorising and the literature on TMT strategic decision-making.  
 
This paper also explores the overlap between ‘dialogical’ (Morin, 2006) and ‘dialectical’ 
processes of management inquiry. Although both emphasise thesis-antithesis antagonisms, 
‘dialogical’ oppositions continue without synthesis/resolution (Montuori, 2004). Morin’s 
theorising on complexity (e.g. 1992; 1999; 2007a) reveals its logical core as ‘dialogical.’ This 
is not a response to paradoxes but rather consideration of their ‘complementarity 
antagonisms’ and vitalising ‘productive play’ (Morin, 2007b). Our innovative ‘dialogical-
dialectic’ approach again considers the interaction of both for, although ‘dialectical’ synthesis 
is the goal, value is added by ‘an inquiry into the dialogical and recursive relationship 
between subject and object, self and other, head and heart, an ongoing invitation to, and 
navigation of, the paradoxical nature of the creative process’ (Montuori, 2003, pps. 253-254) . 
 
Longitudinal qualitative data on CEO/TMT start-up strategising processes were collected 
over two years, following two years observing the corporate-parent. CEO/TMT, ‘top 
executives who have a direct influence on the formulation of a firm’s strategy’ (Nielsen, 
2010, p.305), make strategic choices in business developments directed by previous choices 
(Festing and Maletzky, 2011). They are affected by organizational cultures (Giddens, 1984), 
‘tacit organizational understandings… that contextualize efforts to make meaning, including 
internal self-definition’ (Hatch and Schultz, 2002, p.996). When parent-corporate values 
downplay innovative management in volatile environments, tensions decrease TMT 
participation, preventing positive strategic developments (Mantere and Vaara, 2008).  
 Dialectical-paradoxical tensions in corporate-formed ventures are neglected in showing how 
CEO/TMT strategising processes operate in multi-level contexts (Nielsen, 2010). Extant 
literature focuses upon CEO/TMT strategic responses to external macro-environmental 
pressures, neglecting ‘dialectical-paradoxical’ internal processes. Engaging with 
internal/external contextual configurations, we inductively explore longitudinal interplays 
between contexts of action, strategic decision-making and emergent ‘dialectical-paradox’ 
tensions in the corporate start-up to better understand TMT dynamics (e.g. Yamak et al., 
2013).  Iterative dialectical (Berniker and McNabb, 2006) and dialogical movements 
(Montuori, 2003; Paulus, Woodside and Ziegler, 2008; Wegerif, 2008) locate this ‘dialectical-
paradox’ approach within ‘the dynamic equilibrium model which is very close to the dialectic’ 
(Van den Berghe, 1963, p. 704).  
 
Our dialectical-paradox model follows iterative dialogical-dialectic movements between 
literature and CEO/TMT frames (Goffman, 1974). Longitudinal analyses provide empirical 
evidence, highlighting theoretically-informed understandings of CEO/TMT dynamics in 
parent-venture strategising contexts. Our lens reveals dynamic interplay where ‘dialectical-
paradoxes’ interweave through strategy processes.   
 
Literature framing the research 
Dialectical-Paradoxes of Strategic Decision-making and Organizing 
Successful strategy relies increasingly on flexible structures (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997; 
Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998; Osborn, 1998; Whittington et al., 1999). Corporates sometimes 
allocate strategies to different units through spatial separation (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; 
Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003), although constrained by parent ‘corporate-culture’ (Hatch, 
1993). Strategic decision-making cannot ignore such strategy formation contexts (Pettigrew, 
1992) where ‘culture-carrying’ corporately-owned ventures require decision-making speed 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989a) and information access (Huff and 
Reger, 1987).  
 
In such ambivalent, complex contexts (Mintzberg, Rasinghani and Theoret, 1976), 
strategising is envisaged as rational, top-driven, CEO-led, after option assessment (Hendry, 
2000; Keck, 1997; Noda and Bower, 1996; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) of appropriate 
structures for strategic achievement (Burgelman, 1983, 1991; Noda and Bower, 1996). 
However, changing circumstances slow-down rational decision-making processes (Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990a; 1990b), requiring ongoing improvisation (Montuori, 
2003; Orlikowski, 1996) and strategy through practice (Whittington, 1996). Reality 
construction, responsive to cumulative micro-events (Chia, 1996), leads to reweaving ‘webs 
of beliefs and habits of action to accommodate new experiences obtained through 
interactions’ (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002, p. 567). Revolution-causing events are ‘punctuated 
events’ within a ‘punctuated equilibrium model’ (Gersick, 1991). Dialectical two-way 
processes develop, with oft-opposing, mutually acknowledged, viewpoints interlocking 
(Canales, 2012).  
 
The ‘deliberate-emergent’ paradox continuum along which real-world strategies fall (de Wit 
and Meyer, 2004; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985, p. 3) reflects strategising conforming to 
neither extreme (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). Decision models remain persistent 
empirical foci of TMT practices (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992; Pettigrew, 1992; Sminia, 
2005), even in complex, emergent, fluid processes (Styles, 2001). Strategising interweaves 
external and organizational forces ‘produced and reproduced through the interplay between 
actors and their organizational context over time’ (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002, p. 366). 
Organizational cultural values impact on strategic decisions directly or indirectly (Hatch, 
1993; Johnson, 1987; Schein, 1992), through organizational learning (Williams, 2001). 
Dialogic communication helps participation-promoting strategies (Hatch, 2006), where 
skilled management of strategic contradictions and alternatives enhances organizational 
learning (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Dialogical-dialectic 
processes involve communicative interactions between top-down and bottom-up discourses 
providing different strategic paths with alternatives challenging dominant discourses 
(Mumby, 2005). Resulting tensions ‘characterize the strategy field and should be taken 
seriously in research’ (Mantere and Vaara, 2008, p.356).  
 
‘Dialectical-Paradoxes’ of CEO/TMT Unity/Diversity 
Quantitative, cross-sectional investigations outnumber qualitative analyses of TMT strategic 
dynamics (Nielsen, 2010), especially of entrepreneurial ventures (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Kor, 2003). TMT research neglects smaller ventures, focusing on larger 
companies (Escriba-Esteve, Sanchez-Peinado and Sanchez-Peinado, 2009; Huse, 2000), and 
how TMT abilities influence organizational performance (Lubatkin, Ling and Veiga, 2006; 
Patzelt, Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß and Nikol, 2008). Venture performance analyses neglect 
TMT dynamics (Ensley, Pearson and Pearce, 2003), and ‘in-depth inquiries into antecedents 
of TMT composition and the multilevel contextual influences ….are still needed’ (Nielsen, 
2010, p.301). We respond to this call. 
 
Studies on TMT composition (Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004) show CEO 
dominance, and TMT diversity/interaction levels affect strategic decision-making (Papadakis 
and Barwise, 2002). Functionally heterogeneous TMTs may prevent quick responses to 
external environmental changes or adopting unconventional, alternative solutions (Keck, 
1997). Greater diversity of TMT perspectives (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), competing for 
dominance over strategic formulation and implementation (Pfeffer, 1981), can become 
counterproductive, dysfunctional, with cognitive-affective conflict (Amason, 1996; Amason 
and Sapienza, 1996); preventing communication and novel ‘frame-breaking’ ideas 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996); blocking strategic achievements; decelerating decision-
making in high-speed environments (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Wagner, Pfeffer 
and O’Reilly, 1984). Paradoxically, diverse expertise, knowledge and specialist skills can 
contribute interpretative, intrapreneurial solutions improving decision-making quality 
(Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Kickul and 
Gundry, 2001; Milliken and Martins, 1996; Pitcher and Smith, 2001; Williams and O'Reilly, 
1998). Recent research (Souitaris and Maestro, 2010) argues that innovative technological 
environments require TMT polychronicity with members engaging in multiple, diverse 
functional tasks simultaneously; reaching strategic decisions faster with less analysis; 
improving organizational performance. Diversity, combined with increased levels of TMT 
purposive interaction can foster debate, novel ideas and successful solutions (Cannella, Park 
and Lee, 2008; Kickul and Gundry, 2001); with team effectiveness improved ‘through 
appropriate process choices’ (Edmondson, Roberto and Watkins, 2003, p. 297). Successful 
early venture developments are team-based, with direct leadership, open communication and 
social integration positively relating to team viability (Foo, Sin and Yiong, 2006).  
Such paradoxical theories about TMT diversity-leadership-viability (Nielsen, 2010) highlight 
CEO potential to ‘neutralize both beneficial and debilitating composition effects’ (Jackson, 
1992, p.371). Autocratic CEOs’ rigid management styles, roles, processes and practices 
hinder TMT debate, creativity and novel solutions. CEO-dominated models involve issuing 
‘instructions to the remainder of the executive team’ (Talaulicar, Grundei and Werder, 2005, 
p. 520), with TMT decision-making restricted to making sense of ambiguous, unstructured 
information from the external environment (Hambrick, 1995). In practice, strategic choices 
rarely involve TMT members equally, with CEO plus core, influential sub-group making 
major decisions (Roberto, 2003). Such fault-lines are powerful predictors of TMT 
dynamics/performance and decision-making (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; 2005; Nielsen, 
2010). Strong fault-line settings hamper important strategic innovations requiring TMT 
communication and consensus (Barkema and Chvyrkov, 2007).  
 
 ‘Dialectical-Paradoxes’ in Action 
Inherent socially-constructed ‘opposing yet interrelated dualities are embedded in the process 
of organizing and are brought into juxtaposition via environmental conditions’ (Smith and 
Lewis, 2011, p.388). ‘Dialectical-paradox’ processes encourage TMT responses entailing 
iteration among strategies and their impacts. 
 
TMT roles are important in corporate-ventures (Kuratko and Audretsch, 2013). 
Organizational identities and leadership styles significantly influence intrapreneurship (Covin 
and Slevin, 1989; 1991; Moriano et al., 2011; Miller, 1983) innovativeness, risk-taking and 
proactiveness (Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon, 2011; Kreiser, Marino and Weaver, 2002; Morris et 
al., 2007; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). However, individuals face tensions when adopting 
new top-management roles (Ibarra, 1999; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2006; Smith and Lewis, 
2011). Working through organizational paradoxes (Luscher and Lewis, 2008) challenges 
managers whose previous practices and organizational identities create obstacles to change 
(Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), and adoption of improvisation (Montuori, 2003) and 
‘bricoleurial’ mind-sets (Di Domenico, Haugh and Tracy, 2010). 
 
Such ambiguities lead to dialectical interpretations of power-relationship and process 
paradoxes (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Spicer, Alvesson and Kärreman, 2009), observable ‘in-
action’ at TMT board-meetings (Samra-Fredericks, 2000). In volatile environments, 
CEO/TMT-generated micro-level tensions, reflecting corporate-venture dynamics (Bligh, 
Pearce and Kohles, 2006), eventually propel strategy change through structural changes in 
TMT composition and catalytic TMT board-meeting dynamics (Brundin and Nordqvist, 
2008; Machold et al., 2011), involving strategic contradiction management (Smith and 
Tushman, 2005).  
 
Dialectical interpretations can help interpret organizational phenomena (Benson, 1977; 
Lourenco and Gildewell, 1975; Seo and Creed, 2002). Dialectical standpoints involve 
tensions, contestation, opposing forces tending toward negation, in turn being negated by 
higher order processes, often allowing preserved aspects of originally negated positions (Di 
Domenico, Tracey and Haugh 2009). Dialectical tensions thus engender transformations of 
arrangements and processes (Benson, 1977). Lourenco and Glidewell’s (1975) longitudinal 
study of interactions between local television station and company headquarters utilised 
dialectical analysis of manifest-latent tension balancing of multiple power-bases. Our 
‘dialectical-paradoxical’ lens views interplays between inherent systematic parent-venture 
tensions and CEO/TMT social constructions through on-going experiences (Ashcraft, Kuhn 
and Cooren, 2009; Clegg, Cuhna and Cuhna, 2002). Organizations are ‘inherently 
paradoxical since they are defined by boundaries between self and other, individuality and 
collaboration, and ingroup and outgroup’ (Smith and Lewis, 2011, p.385). However, 
individuals create paradoxical tensions within particular times or spaces (Poole and Van de 
Ven, 1989), sometimes through ‘doublethink’ mechanisms (El-Sawad, Arnold and Cohen, 
2004). The gap in paradox research reflected in this ‘ontological disparity’ (Smith and Lewis, 
2011, p.385) is explored here through the combined ‘dialectical-paradox’ concept, allowing 
for pluralistic TMT standpoints challenging increasingly diffused, CEO-led authoritarian 
framing contexts (Denis, Langley and Rouleau, 2007; Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 2007). 
Evolving action contexts change understandings for actors struggling with conflicting needs 
(Luscher and Lewis, 2008), and team roles and power distribution (Jackson, 1992). Power 
relating to TMT leadership and status differences explains inconsistent research findings 
(Jackson, Joshi and Erhardt, 2003). Thus, ‘dialectical-paradox’ views of changing CEO/TMT 
power relationships are developed in this case study to explain strategic change. 
 
Methodology  
The research aimed to explore how parent-company, corporate-based constraints on 
CEO/TMT entrepreneurial start-up orientations encouraged/discouraged TMT strategy 
formulation and participation in strategic decision-making. The ‘dialectical-paradox’ forces 
thereby released explain subsequent strategic change. Our objective was to examine 
CEO/TMT shaped venture strategy from inception until two years afterwards. Parental 
organizational and environmental contexts, observed for two years previously, provided 
corporate strategising antecedents. Access to parent-company executives who later joined the 
venture was given before launch, aiding our understandings of event evolution and parental 
influences on strategy.  
 
Our qualitative research was rigorously conducted, presenting opportunities for theory 
building (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Myers, 2009), allowing ‘analytical generalizations’ 
(Tsoukas 1989) about those processes that encourage/discourage participation in strategic 
decision-making. The interpretivist, longitudinal approach, comparing ‘emergent concepts 
[and] theory …. with the extant literature’ (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 544), encouraged iterative 
movements from research context to literature during the study. It became apparent that 
dialectical pressures and developing tensions within changing CEO/TMT configurations, 
propelled processes toward strategic change (Van de Ven, 1992). Dialectical theory 
conceptualized TMT power relationships (Benson, 1977), though originating from complex, 
internal-external, CEO/TMT paradoxical dynamics. Emerging processes of ‘conflict, 
paradox, [and] mutual interaction’ (Zeitz, 1980, p. 73) ‘best-fitted’ the developing context 
leading to the ‘dialectical-paradox’ concept. The research’s evolved ‘dialectical-paradox’ 
theoretical frame positions its theory-building properties (Suddaby, Hardy and Huy, 2011; 
Zahra and Newey, 2009), pluralistically exploring dialogues at ‘the intersection of various 
theoretical perspectives’ (Ridder, Hoon and McCandless Baluch, 2012, p. 5). Our ‘iterative 
dialogical-dialect’ method thereby explored tension-oriented dialogues empirically and 
theoretically (Ball, 1979; Poole and Van de Ven, 1989).  
 
Method and Research Approach  
The longitudinal case-study of ‘UK-Research-Tech’ aimed to explore strategy formation in 
context, investigating CEO-TMT relationship dynamics, structures and strategy 
implementation. We explored the start-up’s development from uncertain inception until 
second year post-launch, when original strategies were refocused. We proposed to understand 
how strategic decision-making processes were (re)shaped by CEO-TMT structures, 
interactions and contexts. Our inductive longitudinal research approach allowed for 
theoretical ideas emanating from research developments, with timely in context exploration 
of TMT dynamics and structural/strategic decision-making processes through data 
engagement and accounts construction.  
 
UK-Research-Tech was selected for several methodological and practical reasons. It allowed 
for an in-depth, ‘revelatory’ case-study (Yin, 2003), exploring the under-researched small, 
corporate-owned, start-up context. It was a ‘critical’ case, empirically resonant of theoretical 
claims that start-ups in volatile, uncertain environments are structured to facilitate rapid, 
nimble strategic decision-making. It was practically feasible as high-level access was granted, 
albeit with considerable prior negotiation with the Marketing Director, and subsequently 
CEO, facilitated by a researcher being employed during the previous two years as a parent-
company consultant. Exploration from venture inception allowed account construction 
around decision-making dynamics, structures and processes to discover whether they enable 
or constrain strategic action.  
 
Triangulation occurred with multiple types, sources and methods of data collection (Denzin, 
1970), including recurrent interviews, in-situ observations and conversations and 
organizational documents. Our triangulated approach, with collation of various data from 
different primary and secondary sources, enhanced the internal reliability of researcher 
interpretations and developed a full picture of events. Table 1 shows the triangulated data 
with details, such as source, types, collection frequency, participants, time period, duration 
etc.  
INSERT-TABLE-1-HERE 
Primary data included several focussed in-depth interviews with key participants – CEO and 
all five TMT members (Directors of Operations, Marketing, IT, Finance and Sales). The 
interviews involved sets of three or four interviews with each TMT member and CEO, 
conducted over relevant time periods as reflected in Table 2. This provides a break-down of 
number of separate interviews conducted, their duration, and the time period covered for each 
key research participant. Recurrent interviews were generally between 30 to 60 minutes long, 
all being recorded and transcribed verbatim soon after being conducted. Direct quotations are 
from interview transcripts. 
INSERT-TABLE-2-HERE 
These interviews elicited each person’s perceptions, accounts and interpretations about roles 
in development, strategy and decision-making. The main focus when conducting interviews 
was on TMT actions in developing strategy. Internal validity was strengthened through 
maintaining this focus during interviews, supported by interview protocols (Yin, 2003; 2009). 
Tables 3a and 3b provide the interview protocol used for TMT Directors and CEO 
respectively, with guiding questions and themes covered. These flexible, inductive ‘aides-
mémoire’ were adapted when necessary. Themes/questions were probed further where 
pertinent during subsequent interviews/conversations with participants. The interview 
protocols reflected those themes discussed with the CEO and other TMT members to guide 
ethnographic conversations. This approach enhanced internal validity by ensuring 
interpretative rigour, data corroboration, reliability and field penetration and triangulation 
through cross-referencing to other evidence sources, thereby building more detailed and 
nuanced case narratives. Table 4 outlines the descriptive demographics/background details of 
CEO and TMT, facilitating depictions and understandings of ‘UK-Research-Tech’ TMT 
dynamics, helping inform case narrative and interpretation development.  
INSERT-TABLE-3a-TABLE 3b-AND-TABLE-4-HERE 
A researcher-observer in-situ attended formal monthly TMT meetings commencing the 
second year, and informal meetings involving different TMT members, including CEO, 
throughout study duration. Observation of ‘water cooler’ and ‘coffee-room’ interactions 
occurred at least monthly over the research period. ‘Embeddedness’ was achieved through 
first-hand organizational ethnographic observations/conversations (Van Maanen, 2011; 
2002), allowing data saturation, immersion and understanding (Kunda, 1993), unobtainable 
through interviewing alone (see Table 1). Additional research notes and observations, 
meticulously captured in a field diary, pertained to conversations and other naturally 
occurring phenomena, important for meso-level research necessitating both individual-level 
and group/team-level data collection (Bligh et al., 2006).  In addition documentary data were 
obtained from both publicly accessible annual reports and confidential documentation, such 
as meeting minutes and strategy papers written by TMT members for pre-decision 
discussions. They helped situate the interview material within wider interactive contexts (see 
Table 1). For all primary and confidential secondary data collected, consent was given and 
anonymity assured in accordance with approved ethical practices.   
 
 Analysis  
Data collection followed an ‘open’, inductive approach. Research rigour and interpretative 
reliability stemmed from data triangulation and in-depth research-setting immersion, 
consistently framing data construction and analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Interpretations and 
theoretical developments grounded in the data, were based on emergent dialogic 
understandings involving both researchers comparing research insights with relevant 
literature iteratively throughout the analysis. The in-depth interviews, naturally occuring 
conversations, and obervations were combined with secondary documentary evidence and 
TMT papers. This involved multiple close readings by both researchers of various textual 
data, followed by thematic analytic coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Rigorous, in-depth 
data familiarization and immersion conducted through repeated data readings, involved 
iterative interpretation of participants’ own socially-constructed understandings. Thematic 
coding, used to compare and reduce data into meaningful segments, involved collated text 
being marked and grouped. The analysis process achieved data reduction/interpretation 
through thematic-coding and inter-textual comparison, with themes identified, and segments 
apportioned within these categorizations.  
 
Table 5 shows our thematic coding scheme that emerged during the course of the analysis 
and constituent sub-themes and codes used for data reduction/comparison. We found that 
collated evidence could be reduced and grouped according to three coded themes highlighting 
the change sequences identified over the research course. These are: A. case narrative: 
parent-company influences and business start-up; B. CEO/TMT dynamics: pressures and 
tensions; C. strategy change: decision to focus on vertical markets. Each of these thematic 
codes contains a number of sub-codes (seven in total) as reflected in Tables 5 and 6. All data 
excerpts presented here result from this process. As two researchers were involved, in order 
to ensure reliability and consistency, data coding was undertaken by each researcher and then 
reviewed by the other by ‘code-checking’ with constant discussion of emerging 
interpretations (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This was chosen as the preferred approach to 
coding validation (e.g. rather than more standard double coding). It best suited and enabled 
the analysis process to be more closely interwoven with the emerging conceptual frame and 
longitudinal methodological approach, by being conducted in a continuous, discursive and 
iterative-dialogic fashion. Inter-coder agreement was thus high, supported by our use of 
constant comparison, discussion, interpretative memos and regular checking of each other’s 
coding. In addition, the original text was regularly examined in its fuller context (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), in terms of sources and overall case in order to decide upon categorization.  
INSERT-TABLE-5-HERE 
In line with the inductive approach, our findings reflect our analysis and theorising whereby 
our analytical critique and emerging theoretical lens are presented.  The next section sets the 
narrative scene, providing for discussion interwoven with data interpretations. Thematic 
codes identified during our analysis (see Tables 5 and 6) are used to provide structure for 
presenting our interpretative findings, permeated by the overarching concept of ‘dialectical-
paradoxical’ forces in action. To provide for fuller reading of our findings and transparency 
of data interpretations, the coding scheme containing emerging codes and sub-codes and 
corresponding illustrative empirical examples of coded data from triangulated evidence is 
provided in Table 6. Examples cover parent-corporate influences on the start-up, dynamic 
interactions and pressures/tensions within the CEO/TMT, and strategy change decision-
making dynamics. We provide indicative original examples to show how data triangulation 
was conducted.  
INSERT-TABLE-6-HERE 
Our later discussion critiques and extends the earlier literature analysis highlighting our 
conceptual path, through ideas generation and follow-up literature ‘threads’ indicated by 
emergent data interpretations and empirically-derived arguments developed through our 
inductive analysis.  
 UK-Research-Tech case-study findings: Telling it ‘as it was’ through the accounts of the 
CEO and TMT Directors   
Case Narrative: Parent-Company Influences, Launch and Business Start-up  
Inductive research encourages timely discovery of key processes and patterns, changes and 
continuities, within the developing case narrative, facilitating appreciation of crucial triggers, 
mechanisms, decisions, significant challenges and evolving/resolving events (Pettigrew, 
1990a). The case narrative time-line matrix, verified by two interviewees for member checks 
(Stake, 1995), is shown in Table 7.  
INSERT-TABLE-7-HERE 
‘UK-Research-Tech’, an internet technology-based telecommunication company venture, 
was started to provide automatic identification solutions to diverse industries, from 
manufacturing and retailing to defence, characterised by intense manual data capture, large 
numbers of mobile assets and extended supply chains. Five months before its launch, the 
‘investor community’ within the corporate-parent appointed a dedicated two-member project 
team of external consultant and internal representative, tasked with exploring new business 
ideas through workshops, seminars, and ‘group brainstorms’ across parent company and key 
customers. They outlined twenty-five ideas, subsequently reduced to six, all previously 
explored by the parent-company. After three months, two ideas remained: 1) 
developing/providing ‘point-of-sale’ software to retailers; 2) radio frequency identification 
(RFID) technology with many potential business applications. The project team argued that 
RFID technology was sufficiently robust to be applied extensively within various industries.  
 
A dedicated team of CEO and five directors was planned to shape the venture’s future 
strategic direction. However, only two executives from the parent, the CEO and Marketing 
Director, also from the project team, were recruited for the launch, both interested from the 
venture’s inception. The CEO confirmed the project team’s approved proposal to the parent-
company’s investor community. The venture was launched around RFID technology to 
various industries, apparently the least risky strategy. The CEO described himself as an 
incremental, risk-averse leader for implementing this strategy: “I try to be steady…I like the 
analogy as a long distance runner who just keeps a steady pace.  Lots of steady sort of 
rational decisions” (CEO). He hired the IT Director externally a month post-launch, although 
the latter had earlier worked for the parent-company. He was given the specific formal brief 
of examining the technology architecture development. In actual fact, he spent his first year 
mainly supporting sales. Two months later, two other parent-company executives joined the 
TMT as Operations and Finance Directors, respectively responsible for delivery and 
implementation of projects to customers, and setting-up commercial and legal agreements. In 
May of the venture’s second year, the TMT was expanded again with the Sales Director’s 
external appointment without prior parent-company history.  
TMT members had come together largely serendipitously despite parent-company history, 
albeit in separate business areas. Prior to UK-Research-Tech recruitment, neither work nor 
social relationships existed amongst them. According to the Operations Director, TMT 
formation was “pure luck” with TMT members having high levels of specialised functional 
knowledge. Apart from the Marketing Director’s involvement in the project team, and 
subsequently with the designated CEO, no other TMT member was directly involved in the 
strategic decision to pursue RFID technology-based future business directions across various 
industries. Initial UK-Research-Tech developments focussed around business design, mainly 
planning operational aspects and related resource allocation, changing subsequently to actual 
business growth through broadening and increasing sales activities.   
 
TMT Dynamics: Pressures and Tensions 
The CEO continued the strategy of exploiting RFID technology in various industries. The 
CEO/TMT orientations became mainly dictated by short-term priorities – i.e. obtaining 
parent-company financing, getting started, and securing successful deals. 
 
“So there was a lot of … communicating the design and aspiration to fairly senior people 
within the parent-company to secure funding.  Having got that funding, the role then 
shifted… recruiting people, building a team, building technology which is core to our 
business and selling the concept without actually having anything to sell!” (CEO).  
 
He aimed to keep the venture and team initially small to keep costs down rather than 
developing more entrepreneurial orientations towards business developments: 
 
“ I don’t want to create a big human organization yet because I can’t guarantee the returns 
to support those fixed costs… an explicit principle originally to keep overheads fixed, costs to 
a minimum, which means a small team” (CEO).  
 
CEO time was mainly spent on day-to-day management, business design, identifying 
functional priorities, recruiting employees. The simple functional organizational structure he 
planned enabled delineating and designing directors’ roles.  
 “… I’m probably fairly traditional in the design that is where you can separate the 
commercial from marketing, from sales, from technology operations.” (CEO).   
 
Keeping costs down, in the first year no Sales Director was appointed. The directors covered 
sales and did not participate in formal strategic processes, merely implementing the CEO’s 
autocratic decisions. Formal team meetings were not convened regularly, with only ad hoc 
meetings communicating information about CEO decisions. “…there was so much going on 
that they [meetings] just never happened… you know [the CEO] didn’t have 
time…”(Operations Director). The CEO consulted informally mainly with the Marketing and 
IT Directors.  
 
“Normally ideas and strategic initiatives tend to get talked about…until the point where 
either me or [the CEO] writes down a page - this is what we think - which then gets 
circulated …until finally the CEO takes the decision …he tends to listen to the  IT Director 
and to me  a lot..” (Marketing Director).   
 
The Operations and Finance Directors, although not included in the CEO’s inner circle, 
shared information with each other. Both felt that “…the danger of not communicating 
regularly enough is that you may end up… away from some points...” (Operations Director). 
The Finance Director said that they were unhappy because of poor communication and 
tensions among TMT members. However, all were occupied spending their first year 
securing successful deals, responding to emerging business opportunities and providing 
bespoke business solutions for various industries. In the Operations Director’s words, “We 
just carried on!” Nonetheless, despite poor communication, lack of decision-making 
participation and no formal regular meetings, the venture’s small size and TMT members’ 
close physical proximity meant they found out, at least informally, what was happening.  
 
“So what tends to happen... if the CEO and the Finance Director are here, I can have a 
conversation with them and, then, if the CEO and the Marketing Director talked over the 
similar conversation, the elements of information are passed on…” (Operations Director). 
 
In the first year, directors’ tasks did not exactly match their job descriptions although they 
continued to maintain their core functional roles.  
 
“I am the chief technology officer, responsible for building the IT architectures.  In truth 
most of my time is… a pre-sales role … [customers] need to be convinced that we know what 
we’re talking about so I’ll go out and do a technical pitch to get some credibility.” (IT 
Director).  
 
The CEO followed parent-company strategic direction, directly controlling strategy execution 
through a flat functional structure. 
 
“…everyone has direct access to me which is really important.  Again this is a control thing 
but we are sort of forming ourselves as a brand so I want to make sure I have some control 
over what that brand is.  I don’t want people going off and behaving in a way that is not 
sympathetic with the brand as I perceive it” (CEO).   
 
This structure also enabled response to the adopted strategic direction toward embracing 
customer-led emerging opportunities as the CEO stated, “I wanted a relatively flat team.  I 
don’t want hierarchies at this stage because I want everybody to be customer facing…” This 
was dictated by increasingly bespoke business activities. By the second year it was necessary 
to expand. Numbers increased from twenty to thirty, including the Sales Director’s external 
appointment. Individual tasks became more specific and TMT members found it harder to 
know all that was happening. Similarly lateral communications became increasingly difficult 
and TMT members decreasingly involved, formally or informally, in venture business and 
decision-making.  
 
“In the past… I pretty much knew what was going on day-to-day and I would actually keep 
an action list for everybody and everybody’s actions. Now I don’t do that … As the business 
is growing… jobs have now been narrowed… In the very early days my operations fellow… 
would be involved in sales and marketing, he’d be involved in technology decisions, 
commercial decisions everything and now he’s not because I’ve said you’ve got all this stuff 
to deliver and you’re gonna get more to deliver, you deliver, deliver, deliver… The other 
factor is the business is growing and we’re expecting to hire a few more people.  His reaction 
to that narrowing, of course, is wanting to build an empire… you make decisions without 
consulting other people and you literally build something you own and dictate.  So the 
manifestation of that mindset, having come out of this kind of where we did everything to oh I 
only do this bit, is… he feels devalued and therefore he’s not communicating” (CEO).  
 The directors felt increasingly less involved in decision-making processes for the whole 
venture, and more in executing CEO-allocated functional tasks. Direct TMT involvement in 
decision-making became restricted to functional areas within their direct control with less 
lateral communication. Despite the venture’s growth, the overall organizational structure was 
kept flat to keep the business moving, overhead costs down, and remain customer-facing. The 
titles/roles of TMT members and others still mirrored those of the parent-company, despite 
the venture’s comparatively small size. With uncertainty over future potential business 
growth, this structure still fitted CEO lack of intrapreneurialism and parent-company mindset. 
Tensions increased with pressures for change. Formal monthly meetings were put into place 
in the second year, facilitating communication. Nevertheless, all thought initially they made 
things worse in lacking flexibility and openness in bringing new ideas forward. The CEO saw 
them as mechanisms for communicating his decisions, rather than systems allowing directors 
formal participation in decision-making processes: “We have a monthly team-meeting, it’s 
very one way… It’s not an effective mechanism for having dialogue.  It’s good for 
monologue” (CEO). The Sales Director, displeased with meeting structure and conduct, said 
that with “…regular management meetings, we try and cover things… in reality we will go 
round the loop several times.” (Sales Director). Communications dried-up and initial venture 
dynamism slowed-down with unresolved external environmental pressures, mainly spiralling 
sales costs, building up tensions internally. This put the CEO under pressure to relinquish 
daily micro-managerial tasks. “The CEO who is more driven now … is very much looking 
after the big stuff… and not micro-managing the people who work for him” (IT Director). 
These pressures would force change in the venture’s strategic direction. 
 
Strategy Change: Decision to Focus on Vertical Markets   
Having secured several successful bespoke deals and established the full TMT, meetings 
gradually changed in tone and substance, becoming more participative with members putting 
the CEO under pressure to consider strategy change. This was partly inspired by the Sales 
Director’s appointment, as during the six months following this event, due to changed TMT 
relationships, directors began to encourage CEO focus on strategic planning rather than 
execution. The CEO responded to these pressures:  
   
“So I have now a full management team… I’m less day-to-day involved… increasingly 
thinking well of next year or the following three years… a more strategic view so I can make 
strategic decisions” (CEO). 
 
The changed strategy to focus on vertical rather than varied markets was a deliberate decision 
made by the CEO following an extraordinarily frank, catalytic TMT meeting in December of 
the second year since start-up inception. TMT appreciation of existing business problems 
increased mainly through day-to-day interactions and constantly dealing with customer 
requirements. The directors realised that continuing to provide bespoke applications of RFID 
to broad customer ranges from unrelated industries was highly problematic. Indeed, this 
modus operandi placed much pressure on key venture activities, such as marketing, sales, 
operations, and delivery times. Additionally, overall business growth slow-down required 
developing business solutions replicable across various companies (customers) supplying an 
industry. These considerations about increasingly experienced pressures were brought-up in 
TMT formal meetings.  
 
“We found that the market wasn’t quite ready so we’ve to adapt our offerings and our 
approaches… One of the CEO’s visions was that we would have a very small lean 
management team… managing a lot of outsourcing but also doing a lot of repeatable 
business.  We actually haven’t achieved that because the market is demanding dissimilar 
solutions so we’ve been flexible enough to react to that and come up with solutions… while 
still trying to lean towards the visions…” (Operations Director) 
 
TMT concerns about initial strategy were debated particularly in one crucial formal 
CEO/TMT meeting, shaped strategy change to focus solely on vertical markets. Given the 
autocratic style of management created by the CEO-model adopted, the formal decision to 
focus on vertical markets was taken to, and eventually driven from, the top, with the CEO 
being persuaded at the meeting. It was enabled by ongoing day-to-day TMT practices in 
relation to the external environment, and informal relationships that still existed, between 
CEO and TMT members such as the Marketing Director.   
 
The CEO/TMT finally decided two years after inception to change the venture’s future 
market orientation from bespoke business solutions for customers in any industry, to focus on 
a particular industry and inter-linked supply-chains (companies). The CEO himself took the 
decision to focus on a particular vertical market, aerospace, after engaging in discussion with 
TMT members. Although, formally discussed in the catalytic TMT meeting, documents 
outlining the reasons for focussing on vertical markets had been produced and circulated by 
TMT members such as the Operations Director who explained the evidence for shifting 
focus: 
.  
 “I have raised this [problem] at one of the management meetings and I wrote a paper on it 
and said to my colleagues look this is not just me moaning, this is a problem that we’re 
building up…” (Operations Director)  
 
The Sales Director’s views had been crucial to this decision, for as the Operations Director 
stated, continuing with bespoke solutions would affect sales:  
 
“…to be doing unique solutions, then we should address ourselves that way, we should 
structure ourselves that way, and recognise that the costs of doing that are greater… we may 
be less successful, which obviously gives our sales director concern because if it’s more 
expensive, it’s harder for him to sell it…” (Operations Director).  
 
Not all the directors had been in accord, the issue about whether to specialise in vertical 
markets or continue to provide bespoke solutions involving everyone in lengthy debates. 
Thus the Marketing Director argued with the IT Director who was finally persuaded, agreeing 
the need to specialise in vertical markets. “We had a very strong argument, myself and the IT 
Director about whether we should now verticalise and I felt very strongly that it should be 
verticalised…” (Marketing Director). The CEO was also finally persuaded after arguments 
continued and advice was sought from external consultants. “The CEO was not sure… we 
also got some advice from consultants who were pushing us very strongly in that direction” 
(Marketing Director). The Finance Director described the crucial TMT meeting as involving 
a long debate based on each director arguing from their own functional perspective:  
 
“The Marketing Director is looking at the market saying ‘there’s not enough going on in the 
market for us to keep doing what we’re doing’; the Sales Director is sitting there saying ‘you 
guys got to give me more prospects otherwise I can’t sell anything’. …The IT Director is 
saying ‘I’m an IT guy I want to build more software’… the Operations Director saying ‘…I 
can’t do everything bespoke because, you know, it’s a nightmare from an operations 
perspective’… The CEO put out … He goes away… He takes it away and thinks offline… I 
have to say he makes… decision[s] at the strategic level… he is an introvert thinker… he 
makes up his mind before or after.  He won’t necessarily in a meeting say ‘ok this is the way 
we’re going.’  So he will either have decided before the meeting... or he’ll take on board the 
comments, think about it and then make a decision (Finance Director).  
 
However, despite praising the CEO’s strategic capabilities, TMT members felt that his 
eventual decision to focus on vertical markets was influenced by the TMT meeting ‘show-
down’, and should have been taken much earlier. The period of indecision, slow-down and 
final debates, supported by external consultants’ advice, lasted long. It fortunately just 
avoided, endangering the venture’s success.   
 
Discussion: Through a dialectical-paradox lens  
This two-year longitudinal study, contrasting with ‘point-in-time’ snapshots, has clear 
strengths, critiquing ‘punctuated-events’ (Gersick, 1991) and ‘micro-event processes’ (Chia, 
1996). Emerging narrative realities in this research were shown through triangulation (see 
Table 6). The corporate-cultural mind-set was first highlighted as having been imported into 
the start-up from the parent-company. It effectively ‘slowed-down’ strategic decision-making 
from the start. Our data analysis then increasingly showed how CEO/TMT relationships and 
developing tensions harnessed alternative views/debates among TMT members; and how 
change to previous venture strategy resulted from these built-up tensions as ‘patterns in a 
stream of actions’ (Mintzberg and Waters, 1990). Our triangulated data sets showed the 
constant re-occurrence of internal/external pressures on venture development; resultant 
tensions within the TMT counter-balancing CEO autocratic positioning; and eventual 
TMT/CEO engagement in new, pertinent ‘strategic-change’ thinking.  
 
Our perspective views strategy as complex, ongoing adaptation to change (Pettigrew, 1990b) 
grounded in ‘ongoing practices of organizational actors…’ (Orlikowski, 1996, p.65). We 
explain strategic decision-making in UK-Research-Tech’s TMT through emergent 
dialectical-paradox tensions embedded within dynamic equilibrium frames (Smith and Lewis, 
2011). CEO/TMT tensions harnessed alternative viewpoints and debate among members, 
eventually creating new conditions of dynamic equilibrium, compared to threatening 
destructive disequilibrium, where unresolved tensions could endanger the venture. Thus, 
‘dialectical-paradox’ forces permeating the case narrative’s interpretative-dialogic 
understandings of our complex empirical findings, required ‘complexity thinking’ and 
triangulation rather than more standard approaches (Morin, 2007a; 2007b; Tsoukas and 
Hatch, 2001).  
 
Although autocratic, the CEO, as ‘implementer’ rather than ‘bricoleur’ (Di Domenico, Haugh 
and Tracey, 2010) did not develop clear future strategic directions, but stuck to the parent 
company’s ‘vision’. He did not convince how this parental vision would be achieved or 
consider issues through two-way communicative, open exchanges within the TMT. He did 
not welcome possible viable alternatives (Mantere and Vaara,  2008; Mumby, 2005), despite 
his  rational, deliberate approach (Noda and Bower, 1996). The newly formed TMT became 
divided, with parental culture, lack of diversity (Nielsen, 2010) and TMT fault lines 
preventing members speedily implementing alternative strategic directions when the original 
‘vision’ proved inadequate (Barkema and Chvyrkov, 2007; Lau and Murnighan, 1998; 2005; 
Roberto, 2003).  
 
The simple, CEO-designed, functional structure, outlining each director’s job roles and 
responsibilities, accords with ‘deliberate strategy’ characteristic of ‘machine bureaucracy’, 
where a ‘leader in personal control of an organization guides it according to his/her vision’ 
(Mintzberg and McHugh; 1985, p.162). However, autocratic ‘CEO-modelled’ management 
style (Talaulicar, Grundei and Werder, 2005) implemented the parental vision. Thus, the 
CEO did not ‘strategise’ but rather ‘organized’, attempting to guide the venture towards the 
parentally envisioned future: designing the business, developing systems, recruiting people, 
and defining TMT managerial roles. After venture launch, attempts responding to and/or 
filling gaps created by specific customers’ needs, resulted in some successful deal 
conclusions concerning bespoke applications of the RFID technology. This led to growing 
numbers of contracts signed with customers from different industries putting the TMT under 
considerable pressure and raising doubts about UK-Research-Tech’s ability to deliver the 
promised RFID bespoke solutions efficiently and profitably. The venture became 
increasingly disequilibriated with unfolding events triggering increasing TMT tensions, TMT 
critical meeting ‘show-down’, and eventual return to dynamic equilibrium with the 
CEO/TMT’s changed strategy focus on vertical markets. Thus, CEO/TMT interactions with 
the external environment and ‘dialectical-paradox’ tensions set-up within CEO/TMT 
configurations led to eventual, although tardy, strategic change.  
 
The organizational culture and implementation of the CEO/TMT model with defined 
functional groupings were key elements constraining eventual speedy strategy change. Whilst 
allowing for slow growth and specialisation, they created ‘lower-order’ tensions among 
groups as roles became more defined, allowing for less flexibility, creating ‘invisible 
boundaries’ and functional as opposed to venture-level affiliation. TMT directors’ job-titles 
reflect corporate-parent cultural norms encouraging tension-generation and 
creation/escalation of ‘dialectical-paradox’ forces.  These overt symbols signal corporate-
parent cultural exportation, clashing with innovative, flexible approaches more suited to a 
‘bricoleurial’ venture (Di Domenico, Haugh and Tracey, 2010). Another key facet of UK-
Research-Tech’s culture was reflected in CEO risk-aversion. He looked for slow, incremental 
change and long-term business growth. The CEO-model of ‘risk-averse leader’ doubly 
restricted the speed of strategic decision-making, especially in the context of a technology 
start-up where speed and risk-taking should have been likely expectations. Consistent with 
Talaulicar, Grundei and Werder’s (2005) study of TMTs in high tech-start-ups, this venture’s 
CEO eventually needed to listen to the TMT before making strategy changes to focus 
business on vertical markets. His slow, late response to the tensions generated by the 
inefficiencies of earlier CEO-corporate-imposed decision-making processes, created 
dangerous tensions eventually resolved in strategic direction change. The slow, deliberate 
decision-making processes reflected the parent’s where most directors came from. This 
common cultural trait represented a CEO/TMT contextual and historical tie. Respect amongst 
TMT members also reflected this and the high professional corporate competence that each 
member perceived in others. In other words, perception of ‘skills and competence in the 
domain of interest’ (Meyer and Gavin, 2005, p. 874) was critical to the respect that directors 
had towards each other. However, they were paradoxically also required implementers of 
CEO strategic decisions, thereby creating further tensions. However, when it came to 
questioning the original strategic decision in the catalytic formal meeting, this respect helped 
strengthen the hands of TMT members enabling them to persuade the CEO to be less 
intransigent, to listen, and change strategic direction. All these considerations are rooted in 
the parent context that had such a strong influence on the venture, from the emergence of 
initial strategy onward. Characteristics of the parent context help us understand how the TMT 
drew upon specific socio-cultural elements in constructing strategic action for the new 
venture (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002). At UK-Research-Tech, prior parent-embedded 
decisions about strategy and structure created dialectical-paradox tensions ‘strait jacketing’ 
subsequent decisions about strategy.  
Figure 1 develops a model of our ‘dialectical-paradox’ conceptual framework that emerged 
through our iterative ‘dialogical-dialectic’ interpretations of the case-study empirical 
findings, and the CEO/TMT dynamics which led to strategic change.   
INSERT-FIGURE-1-HERE 
 
Conclusions  
This paper used the ‘UK-Research-Tech’ case of a corporate high-tech start-up, to offer new 
insights into strategising issues. It contributes to ongoing theoretical debates through 
combining ‘dialectical-paradox’ dynamic equilibrium interpretations of themes around 
‘deliberate’ versus ‘emergent’ strategy, and ‘strategising’ versus ‘organizing’, and how they 
are intertwined. The analysis focused on the context of the unfolding strategic decision-
making process, the interactions between actors (i.e. CEO and TMT directors) and 
internal/external contexts. The critical discussion built upon the findings by further 
elaborating on the iterative empirical/theoretical interpretations. These related to the 
identified analytic themes as presented in the methodology, and found during the inductive 
analytic process. As a result, we argue for an augmented conceptual dynamic equilibrium 
frame embracing a dialectical-paradox lens. This emerged during the course of data analysis 
causing extension of our original lens with interpretations that speak to the nuances found in 
the case narrative. As well as empirical field insights, this provides new conceptual 
contributions and a model (Figure 1) for both researchers and practitioners aiming to 
understand strategy contexts in corporate start-ups.   
 
This narrative case’s theoretical framework can be applied to develop understandings of 
socially-constructed strategic action. It provides insights into relationships linking parent and 
venture organizations to strategy processes. Ongoing debates continue on ‘deliberate’ versus 
‘emergent’ strategy and whether ‘organizing’ follows ‘strategising’ or the latter the former. 
However, complexities prevent over-simplification (Morin 2007a; 2007b). The theoretical 
lens of critiquing ‘strategy-as-ongoing-practice’ (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002; 
Whittington, 1996) in terms of micro-level, meso-level and punctuated events, in relation to 
dialectical-paradox forces/tensions, proved useful for interpreting strategising dynamics at 
UK-Research-Tech. We argue that this ‘dialectical-paradox’ lens helps us understand the 
dynamics shaping strategic change.  
 
The study contributes to literature on strategising by focussing on CEO-TMT interactions, 
supporting claims that such an approach provides a reliable view of evolving strategy 
dynamics (Papadakis and Barwise, 2002). In this case, strategy was enacted through CEO-
TMT interactions and the evolving external environment. The study shows that 
organizational context in terms of prior structures and culture constrains strategy formulation. 
According to the extant literature (Lewin and Stephens, 1994; Papadakis and Barwise, 2002), 
centralised functional organizational structuring is the preferred design of risk-averse CEOs 
in that it enables them to achieve high degrees of control through direct supervision. The UK-
Research-Tech case shows that, despite such a controlling context, informal as well as formal 
processes are important arenas for actors’ interpreting strategic problems and making 
strategic decisions. However, informal interactions are more likely to occur with certain 
individuals and in the early stage of business development when each TMT member’s roles 
are relatively broad and ill-defined. As business grew and roles became more sharply defined, 
formal meetings initially served merely to facilitate CEO-monologic information provision to 
TMT members (Eisenhardt, 1999; Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Parent-inherited culture 
constrained subsequent strategic venture decisions. However, formal TMT meetings became 
later key arenas for facilitating strategic change. These could be further focussed upon in 
subsequent research to explore the importance of ‘dialogical’ positioning within them as 
vitalising ‘productive play’ (Morin, 2007b), even without dialectical resolution. 
 
In summary, this parent-venture case-study fills a gap in start-up analyses which have long-
neglected TMT dynamics and contexts (Ensley, Pearson and Pearce, 2003; Nielsen, 2010). 
We show that the CEO’s lack of risk-taking intrapreneurialism and imposition of TMT roles 
and structures better suited to the larger parent-company constrained and slowed down 
necessary change processes especially in terms of the formulation of new strategic decisions. 
Decisions about structure and roles created a strait-jacket for subsequent decisions about 
strategy change, causing business ‘ground-loss’ in a rapidly changing, competitive 
environment. The resultant ‘dialectical-paradox’ pressures eventually forced through change. 
The resultant more disruptive strategic change, although involving active participation of 
TMT members, is ultimately CEO-dictated. At UK-Research-Tech, it was possible to observe 
how the deliberate start-up parental strategy was reinforced by setting-up rigidly structured 
deliberately defined roles, whilst ignoring emergent dialogical-dialectic forces which should 
have led to earlier required flexibility and, if necessary, changed strategy. However, the 
‘dialectical-paradox’ tensions created, through eventual upheaval, successful strategic 
direction change.  
 
This paper has important implications for future research and theorising as well as for 
managers and practitioners. Researchers can build upon these findings to better understand the 
importance of considering dialectical-paradox to interrogate alternative strategies and broader 
organizational contexts. We need more longitudinal case-studies embracing a dialectical-
paradox lens to understand better with immediacy the dynamics of TMT strategic decision-
making. Whilst this paper has focussed upon the corporate start-up, future studies could 
explore this within alternative contexts such as independent start-ups (i.e. non-corporate-owned 
spin-outs) and within larger organizational settings. From a practitioner perspective, the 
research and conceptual model can help explicate for strategic decision-makers, especially 
CEOs, that quality and speed of processes benefit from understanding, not just functional 
diversity of team composition, but also sources of potential and present dialectical-paradox 
tensions. These emerge particularly where ventures are corporate-owned start-ups, but are 
present in all systems. Nonaka and Toyama (2002) see the firm ‘as a dialectical being’. 
Leadership must also support ‘dialogical’ oppositions, harnessing their constant, unresolved 
tensions, thereby enabling the venture not merely to survive but improve and succeed.  
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Table 1. Approach to data triangulation during longitudinal field work study of UK-
Research-Tech* 
Method Data Sources/ Empirical Examples 
1. Interviews: In-depth 
interviews with key 
participants   
Total of twenty focussed interviews conducted 
onsite with the CEO and individual TMT members 
at regular intervals during the study (i.e. January 
20Xa – December 20Xb).  
2. First-hand ethnographic 
observations/ conversations: 
data captured in field diary 
using researcher-generated 
research notes   
Attendance and observation at formal monthly TMT 
meetings at start-up; frequent observation of 
informal meetings/ conversations between different 
members of the TMT, including CEO (i.e. these 
were unplanned in-situ events captured whilst 
visiting the start-up for data collection – at least 
monthly over the two year period); observation of 
interactions at the water-cooler and in the coffee 
room also occurred frequently (i.e. at least monthly 
over the two year period).  
3. Organizational documents and 
other background sources of 
information informing case 
analysis 
Parent company’s annual reports and web pages; 
minutes of monthly TMT meetings attended at start-
up; papers, documents and diagrams written by 
CEO/TMT members to inform strategy; e-mails and 
other correspondence from CEO/TMT members.    
*The organizational pseudonym and inclusion of indicative dates, and of job roles rather than 
individual names, protect participant and case identification. 
 
 
Table 2. Details of in-depth interviews with CEO and TMT Directors, UK-Research-Tech* 
In-depth interviews with key participants 
Research 
participant 
Time period over 
which interviews 
conducted 
Number of 
interviews 
Duration of each interview 
CEO May 20Xa – 
December 20Xb 
4 First interview: 60 minutes; second 
interview: 35 minutes; third 
interview: 40 minutes; fourth 
interview: 45 minutes.  
Director of 
Marketing 
 
January 20Xa – 
December 20Xb 
4  First interview: 30 minutes; second 
interview: 40 minutes; third 
interview: 45 minutes; fourth 
interview: 35 minutes. 
Director of IT June 20Xa – 
December 20Xb 
3 First interview: 40 minutes; second 
interview: 45 minutes; third 
interview: 45 minutes. 
Director of 
Operations 
August 20Xa – 
December 20Xb 
3 First interview: 45 minutes; second 
interview: 33 minutes; third 
interview: 40 minutes. 
Director of 
Finance 
August 20Xa – 
December 20Xb 
3 First interview: 30 minutes; second 
interview: 40 minutes; third 
interview: 35 minutes.  
Director of 
Sales 
May 20Xb – 
December 20Xb 
3 First interview: 30 minutes; second 
interview: 33 minutes; third 
interview: 40 minutes.  
* The organizational pseudonym and inclusion of indicative dates, and of job roles rather 
than individual names, protect participant and case identification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3a. Interview protocol and guide: TMT Directors 
Interview Protocol and Guide (for the Directors of the TMT) 
 
Interviewee demographics/ job-role details 
 
a) Tell me about yourself, your background and your role within ‘UK-Research-Tech’. 
b) How are initial ideas generated by the TMT? 
c) How are the ideas discussed and progressed? 
d) How do you generally interact with the CEO? 
e) How do you generally interact within the team? 
f) How does the whole team interact with the CEO? 
g) What is the frequency of meetings? How is this decided?  
h) What is the communication like within the team and between the CEO and the other 
Directors? 
i) How would you describe the leadership style of the CEO and how have you found 
working with him? 
j) How has the initial strategy of the ‘UK-Research-Tech’ start-up evolved over time? 
k) How are final decisions achieved? Who drives them? 
l) What is the decision-making process like? 
m) What are the drivers of/barriers to the decision-making process? 
 
Table 3b. Interview protocol and guide: CEO 
Interview Protocol and Guide (for the CEO) 
 
Interviewee demographics/ job-role details 
 
a. Tell me about your background and your experiences as CEO of ‘UK-Research-Tech’ 
b. Where do you find insights from when developing business ideas?  
c. Do you generally discuss your first impressions, ideas or plans (openly) with the rest 
of the TMT? 
d. How do you generally interact with the other members of the TMT? 
e. How does the TMT as a whole interact with you? How do the individual directors 
interact with you? 
f. What is the frequency of meetings? How is this decided?  
g. What is the communication like within the TMT? 
h. How would you define or describe your own leadership style? 
i. Which factors impacted on the evolution of the initial strategy of ‘UK-Research-
Tech’ over time? Has the parent company got an influence on it? If so, in what way?  
j. How do you make a final decision?  
k. What is the decision-making process like?   
l. What are the drivers of/barriers to the decision-making process? 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Research participant demographics/ background - TMT/ CEO 
UK-Research-Tech Research Participant Demographics - CEO/TMT 
Position/ role in 
corporate start-up  
Age at joining 
corporate start-
up  
Gender Ethnicity/ 
nationality  
Length of time working 
for the parent company 
before transferring to 
work for the corporate 
start-up 
CEO 39 years Male  White/ 
British  
15 years 
Director of 
Marketing 
37 years Male  White/ 
British 
10 years 
Director of 
Operations 
43 years Male  White/ 
British 
13 years 
Director of 
Finance 
35 years Female  White/ 
British 
9 years 
Director of IT 40 years Male  White/ 
British 
11 years - appointed 
externally*  
Director of Sales 44 years Male  White/ 
British 
0 years – appointed 
externally* 
* Director of IT and Director of Sales appointed by UK-Research-Tech TMT via external 
competitive recruitment. The Director of Sales had never worked for the parent company. 
The Director of IT had previously worked for the parent company for 11 years prior to 
gaining alternative employment elsewhere and subsequent appointment in the start-up.   
Table 5: Emerging thematic coding scheme – constituent codes/ themes for analysis, 
reduction and comparison of triangulated data evidence leading to subsequent 
identification of overall empirically derived interpretative framework 
Inductive Analytic Coding Scheme Used to Inform Evolution of Interpretative Lens  
 
Attributed code label and 
constituent sub-code labels 
for data categorization/ 
comparison 
Code description -  
Inductive themes and sub-themes identified which 
emerged during fieldwork and data analysis 
A. CN:PIS Case Narrative: Parent-Company Influences and Business 
Start-up  
a. PCC Parent Company Culture 
a. ILS Inception, Launch and Start-up 
B. TMT:PT CEO/ Top Management Team Dynamics: Pressures & 
Tensions 
b. RvP Reactive versus Proactive Approaches to Driving the Business 
Forward 
b. EvM Entrepreneurial versus Mechanistic Approach 
      b.   RTvRA Risk Taking versus Risk Aversion 
C. SC:VM Strategy Change: Decision to Focus on Vertical Markets   
c. SBP Shifting Business Priorities Over Time 
      c.   PE Punctuated Events (Key Events Causing Disruption to 
Equilibrium) 
 
 
 
 Table 6: Coding scheme containing emerging codes and sub-codes and corresponding illustrative empirical examples of coded data from 
three key sources of triangulated evidence  
Attributed 
code label for 
data 
categorization/ 
comparison 
Code description - 
inductive themes and sub-
themes identified which 
emerged during fieldwork 
and data analysis 
Illustrative empirical examples of coded data from three key sources of  
triangulated data evidence: 
1. – Example of interview excerpt;  
2. - Example of observation/ field diary excerpt;  
3. – Example of excerpt of notes made from review of documentary evidence 
A. CN:PIS  Case Narrative: Parent-
Company Influences and 
Business Start-up 
A. Empirical Examples/ Data Excerpts 
a. PCC Parent Company Culture  1. “The [parent company] struggled because it’s very process driven…you know, give me a 
report, let’s analyse it, let’s get fifteen people to analyse it, let’s distil it, what’s the answer…oh 
yeah well the decision is obviously this…but we should have made it a year ago because they’ve 
just spent a year thinking about it…” (Operations Director, Interview). 
2. “The parent’s senior managers tend to be cautious and analytical before investing in new 
areas due to their strong identity with the established brand and company’s heritage and desire 
to preserve them.” (Field Observation, Divisional Office, Jan 20Xa, Parent Company). 
3. “The company, proud of its telecommunications legacy, attaches great value and importance 
to its long and rich historical heritage.” (Annual Report 20Xa, Parent Company).  
a. ILS Inception, Launch, Start-up  1. “…for any new venture within [the parent company] in order to get support, it would have to, 
if you like, buy into the corporate views and vision…” (Operations Director, Interview).  
2. “The CEO pointed out to the Marketing Director the need to cross-check market figures on a 
particular industry with the Marketing Division of the parent company.” (Field Observation, 
UK-Research-Tech, May 20Xa). 
3. “It is projected that the growth of the RFID technology in the next 5 years will provide [the 
parent company] with significant additional revenue.” (TMT Internal Strategy Document, May 
20Xa). 
B. TMT:PT CEO/ Top Management 
Team Dynamics: Pressures 
B. Empirical Examples/ Data Excerpts 
 
& Tensions 
b. RvP Reactive versus Proactive 
Approaches to Driving the 
Business Forward  
1. “We actually haven’t achieved that [the CEO’s vision of lean management structure, doing 
lots of outsourcing and repeatable business] because the market is demanding dissimilar 
solutions so we’ve been flexible enough to react to that and come up with solutions that meet 
their [customers’] requirements …” (Operations Director, Interview) 
2. “At the monthly meeting, the CEO outlined the number of deals that the Team was able to 
bring to success in the previous month; he underlined their reliance on those deals in order to 
fuel future growth” (Field Observation, UK-Research-Tech, May 20Xb). 
3. An e-mail circulated by the Operations Director to the rest of the Team prior to the monthly 
meeting under the subject heading “Business Risks” listed a number of potential failures: one of 
them was “inability to respond to Customers X, Y, Z’ s specific queries”. (TMT Internal 
Document, e-mail, Aug. 20Xb).     
b. EvM Entrepreneurial versus 
Mechanistic Approach  
1. “[The Marketing Director] thinks I should be out talking to potential customers…talking at 
conferences and being a CTO…In his head what a CTO should be like is not what is in my 
head…and I think it’s mainly because I come from this [background]…having come from a 
large corporation and then going in the entrepreneurial development of a small company”. (IT 
Director, Interview). 
2. “In informal conversation with the Marketing and Finance Directors …the IT Director 
….underlined the slow pace at developing new technology in order for them to be able to lead 
the market and be the first”. (Field Observation, UK-Research-Tech, April 20Xa).    
3. “An internal document issued by the Finance Director outlined the parent’s policy on sales:  
sales people should have fully observed the parent policy before completing negotiations with 
customers. This policy was very much concerned with pricing and liability. Both elements had 
to be verified internally by the parent company.” (TMT Internal Document, Sept 20Xa).  
      b.  RTvRA Risk Taking versus Risk 
Aversion  
1.”Every time you have to do something new there is a high risk factor of getting it wrong… 
then you end up with a supportability problem because you have to support that new solution… 
If you sell unique solutions like what we are doing at the moment…  that’s obviously a problem 
in my area because I’m delivery focused.” (Operations Director, Interview). 
2. “At the monthly meeting the CEO underlined the need to limit their risk by focussing on 
companies that had already had an established relationship with the parent company”.  (Field 
Obs., UK-Research-Tech, April 20Xb). 
3. An illustrative diagram drawn by the CEO compares Microsoft with Apple; UK-Research-
Tech sits in-between the two, where Microsoft is seen as an incremental innovator and Apple as 
radical innovator. The diagram also shows the trajectory move of UK-Research-Tech towards a 
positioning similar to Microsoft; the bullet points of “volume, speed and risk reduction” are the 
criteria guiding the intended trajectory shift. (TMT Internal Document; Diagram provided by 
the CEO during an interview, in April 20Xb).         
C. SC:VM Strategy Change: Decision 
to Focus on Vertical 
Markets   
C. Empirical Examples/ Data Excerpts 
c. SBP Shifting Business Priorities 
Over Time 
1. “…the [CEO] is looking at…almost like we have to move from being one type of organisation 
to being a totally different type of organisation… We’re trying to do both just now because 
we’re starting initiatives that are making us more structured but at the same time we’re still 
running very fast at the front we’re trying to fuel the market piece.  So I think that’s going to be 
an interesting challenge…” (IT Director, Interview) 
2. “At the monthly meeting, the CEO emphasised the need to grow the business whilst still 
remaining lean without building too many hierarchical layers in order to be able to quickly 
respond to market changes.” (Field Observation, UK-Research-Tech, June 20Xb). 
3. An e-mail circulated by the Sales Director to the rest of the Team posed a specific question: 
Will we start to focus on specific markets only? (TMT Internal Document, e-mail, Sept 20Xb). 
      c.   PE Punctuated Events (Key 
Events Causing Disruption 
to Equilibrium) 
1. “The venture started, if you like, more focused on delivery and bespoke solutions than 
actually the sales side….There was some debate about whether the venture would actually need 
a sales function because [initially] they tried to sell through the existing [parent company]’s 
sales force and leverage that…It has become apparent we do need some focused sales…quite 
distinctly … so I was brought in to effectively set that operation up. [The parent company] sells 
products; we sell services and solutions, quite different.” (Sales Director, Interview). 
2. “At the monthly meeting, the Sales Director provided the figures about the dramatic sales 
increase in just one industry - the aerospace industry – in the previous month. He emphasised 
the support provided by the concept of “shared benefit” amongst the players populating the 
same industry”.  (Field Observation, UK-Research-Tech, Sept 20Xb). 
3. A joint document written by the IT and Sales Directors outlined the need to look at the entire 
supply-chain in specific markets, with the purpose of “linking the dots amongst the players via 
the sharing of the same infrastructure and data” (TMT Internal Document, Oct 20Xb).  
 
Key Dates 
 January 
20Xa 
January – April 
20Xa 
April - May 
20Xa 
May 
20Xa 
June -- August 
20Xa 
Key 
Events 
Initial impetus 
from the parent 
company to launch 
start-up leading to 
the appointment of 
a dedicated 2 
member project 
team 5 months 
prior to the launch 
of the venture. The 
project team 
consisted of an 
external consultant 
and an internal 
representative who 
later became the 
Marketing 
Director of the 
corporate start-up.  
 
Exploration of key 
ideas by the new 2 
member project team. 
This was done via 
meetings, workshops, 
seminars and ‘group 
brainstorms’ run by 
the project team both 
across the parent 
company and also 
externally with some 
key customers. The 2 
member project team 
outlined 25 business 
ideas, subsequently 
reduced to 6, all of 
which had been 
previously explored 
by the parent-
company. 
After three months, 2 ideas 
out of the six remained:  
1) developing/providing 
‘point-of-sale’ software to 
retailers;  
2) radio frequency 
identification (RFID) 
technology with many 
potential business 
applications.  
 
The project team argued that 
RFID technology was least 
risky for the venture and 
sufficiently robust to be 
applied extensively within 
various industries.  
 
 
Launch of corporate start-
up. The first two TMT 
members of the start-up 
comprise the CEO 
(transferred from the 
corporate parent) and 
Marketing Director (the 
latter being one of the 2 
member project team from 
the parent and so familiar 
with initial deliberations). 
 
Formal approval from the 
parent company’s investor 
community is received to 
launch venture, after the 
CEO formally proposes 
focus on RFID technology 
for various industries as 
the least risky strategy.   
Expansion of TMT 
membership through 
appointment of the IT 
Director (externally hired in 
June 20Xa although with 
prior experience working 
for the parent), Finance 
Director and Operations 
Director (appointed in 
August 20Xa from parent). 
These directors helped 
cover sales, along with the 
IT and Marketing Directors. 
They did not participate 
formally in strategising.  
Formal TMT meetings not 
convened with only ad hoc 
meetings held. All TMT 
members implementing the 
CEO’s strategic decisions. 
 
Key 
Triggers 
Parent’s desire to 
re-invent itself and 
enter new markets 
Parent interest in the 
start-up enacted and 
supported.   
Increased confidence about 
the venture within the parent 
company: RFID technology 
previously tested and deemed 
least risky in various markets.  
Obtaining approval for 
strategy by the investor 
community within the 
parent company.  
Need to expand TMT in 
order to help secure the first 
successful deals, convince 
important customers and 
continue on strategic path. 
 
Key dates (cont.) 
 
 
 
August 20Xa- 
March 20Xb 
March – May 
20Xb 
May 20Xb May – December 
20Xb 
December 
20Xb 
Key 
Events 
Increasing number 
of deals secured 
and delivery of 
bespoke solutions 
for different 
industries 
increased through 
combined TMT-
venture efforts. 
 
Lack of sufficient 
sales through 
bespoke solutions 
over a broad range of 
industries. Inability 
to achieve sales 
targets becomes 
apparent to CEO. 
Discussions of these 
issues with TMT at 
formal and regular 
monthly TMT 
meetings started then. 
 
Appointment of the Sales 
Director externally and 
consequent increased size of 
TMT membership due to his 
appointment. 
Increased concerns about 
business slow-down due to 
problems about delivering 
bespoke solutions to 
various customers. Formal 
TMT meetings and aside 
informal meetings held by 
other TMT members; with 
internal strategy papers, 
emails and memos written 
to this effect.  External 
consultants called in also 
by CEO to give advice. 
Crucial monthly TMT 
meeting held in Dec 20Xb 
where strong opinions were  
expressed by TMT members 
putting the CEO under a lot 
of pressure to consider 
strategy change. This, along 
with consultancy report, led 
to the CEO’s decision to 
make a key shift, changing 
the start-up’s strategy to 
focus on vertical markets in 
the aerospace industry.  
Key 
Triggers 
Responding to 
emerging business 
opportunities as 
and when they 
happened and the 
desire to increase 
sales, in which all 
members of TMT 
were involved. 
Formal schedule of 
monthly meetings set 
up because of need to 
improve 
communications 
amongst TMT 
members, and with 
CEO, and especially 
to discuss issues 
related to not 
achieving planned 
sales targets. 
 
Inability of TMT members to 
cope with increasing sales on 
top of their other duties.  
 
The need to increase sales by 
the volume of sales having to 
be professionally managed by 
a specialist recruited 
externally was recognised by 
the CEO and TMT in a 
decision taken in a formal 
TMT meeting in March. 
Continuing slow-down of 
business and building-up 
of tensions in the TMT, 
involving the CEO and the 
other Directors in heated 
debates regarding strategic 
direction of corporate 
start-up. Increasing tension 
also in response to the 
leadership of the CEO in 
terms of the type/means of 
strategic direction adopted. 
Increasing tensions between 
CEO and TMT members on 
strategic direction of start-
up – partly due to on-going 
change in their relationships 
following Sales Director’s 
appointment in the previous 
May; partly due to further 
drop in sales; and partly due 
to TMT meeting discussions 
being bolstered by report of 
the external consultants 
supporting strategy change. 
Table 7: Timeline matrix/ case narrative - key dates, events and triggers emerging from 2 year longitudinal fieldwork involving 5 
months with the 2-member project team in the corporate parent prior to launch of the start-up through to the decision to change 
strategy at the end of the second year*. 
 
*The case narrative write-up was verified by the interviewees for member checks. Two of the informants (the CEO and Marketing Director) 
checked the chronological accuracy, inferential accuracy, and comprehensiveness of key dates, events and triggers. These two informants read, 
revised and validated the case narrative time matrix independently. After three reiterations of this verification process with the CEO and 
Marketing Director, the case narrative time matrix form was agreed and deemed an accurate description of the key dates, events and triggers and 
the decision-making process and strategic change that took place at UK-Research-Tech during the observed period of time. 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model of the Multi-Level Dialectical-Paradox Lens for TMT 
Strategic Decision-Making in Corporate Start-ups  
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